

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

SRI INTERNATIONAL, INC., a California
Corporation,

Plaintiff and
Counterclaim-Defendant,

v.

INTERNET SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC., a
Delaware corporation, INTERNET SECURITY
SYSTEMS, INC., a Georgia Corporation, and
SYMANTEC CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,

Defendants and
Counterclaim- Plaintiffs.

Civil Action No. 04-CV-1199 (SLR)

PUBLIC VERSION

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RECORD FOR THE PARTIES**

**DECLARATION OF GEOFFREY M. GODFREY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
JOINT REPLY MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING INVALIDITY**

Original Dated: July 10, 2006

REDACTED VERSION: July 19, 2006

I, Geoffrey M. Godfrey, declare as follows:

1. I am a member of the law firm of Day Casebeer Madrid & Batchelder LLP, counsel for Defendant Symantec Corporation. I am admitted to practice law before all courts of the State of California.
2. I make this declaration of my own personal knowledge. If called to testify as to the truth of the matters stated herein, I could and would do so competently.
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit QQ is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff SRI's Second Supplemental Responses to Defendant Symantec's First Set of Interrogatories [Nos. 1-12].
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit RR is a true and correct copy of selected pages of the 03/09/2006 and 03/10/2006 Deposition of Phillip Porras (hereinafter "Porras Tr.") and the 03/30/2006 30(b)(6) Deposition of Phillip Porras (hereinafter "Porras 30(b)(6) Tr.").
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit SS is a true and correct copy of selected pages of the 05/26/2006 and 05/29/2006 Deposition of George Kesidis (hereinafter "Kesidis Tr.").
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit TT is a true and correct copy of selected pages of the 03/23/2006 Deposition of Alfonso Valdes (hereinafter "Valdes Tr.").
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit UU is a true and correct copy of selected pages of the 01/27/2006 Deposition of Y. Frank Jou (hereinafter "Jou Tr.").
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit VV is a true and correct copy of selected pages of the 03/31/2006 Deposition of Peter G. Neumann (hereinafter "Neumann Tr.").
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit WW is a true and correct copy of SRI's Supplemental Response to Symantec's Interrogatories Nos. 12 and 15, dated Dec. 15, 2005.
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit XX is a true and correct copy of SRI's Supplemental Response to Symantec's Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 12 (First Set of Interrogatories), 13 and 15 (Second Set of Interrogatories), dated May 05, 2006.
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit YY is a true and correct copy of pages 19-20 of R.

Bace, INTRUSION DETECTION (Macmillan Technical Publishing 2000).

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated: July 10, 2006

By: _____



Geoffrey M. Goffrey

EXHIBIT QQ

**EXHIBIT REDACTED
IN ITS ENTIRETY**

EXHIBIT RR

**EXHIBIT REDACTED
IN ITS ENTIRETY**

EXHIBIT SS

**EXHIBIT REDACTED
IN ITS ENTIRETY**

EXHIBIT TT

**EXHIBIT REDACTED
IN ITS ENTIRETY**

EXHIBIT UU

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

C.A:04-1199 (SLR)

SRI INTERNATIONAL, INC.,)
a California Corporation)

Plaintiff and)
Counterclaim Defendant,)

v.)

INTERNET SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.,)
a Delaware Corporation, INTERNET)
SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC., a Georgia)
Corporation, and SYMANTEC)
CORPORATION, a Delaware)
Corporation,)

Defendants and)
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs.)
- - - - -)

COPY

VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION

OF

Y. FRANK JOU

At Raleigh, North Carolina
January 27, 2006 - 9:53 a.m.

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1 fruit even though if the time or resource
2 is allowed at that point in time.

3 Q. If you go back to the architecture
4 document, J18, on page 3.

5 A. Page 3. Okay.

6 Q. And if you go to Section 2.1.

7 A. Um-hmm.

8 Q. And you go to the third paragraph.

9 A. Um-hmm.

10 Q. The middle of it. And you say, "While it
11 is not within the scope of this project, we
12 expect that the detection analysis
13 functions implemented in the local
14 subsystem can be extended to a global level
15 and correlate intrusion events among
16 several routers." Do you see that?

17 A. Um-hmm.

18 Q. And then it goes on to say, "The management
19 capability which is based on SNMP framework
20 can logically be further extended among
21 management nodes in a hierarchical fashion
22 to establish a status map for an autonomous
23 system."

24 A. Um-hmm.

1 Q. Now, while your DARPA project was limited
2 in time and funding, did you create the
3 design such that it could be extended in
4 this hierarchical fashion?

5 A. I would not say created, because the SNMP
6 network by its nature is to monitor remote
7 system.

8 Q. Um-hmm.

9 A. And be able to reflect a healthy -- the
10 healthy -- the status of the network, you
11 know, it's healthy, whether it's healthy or
12 it's, you know, under stress. That was the
13 intent of the SNMP framework. And our
14 thinking at that point in time was to take
15 advantage of this SNMP by the fact that
16 it's able to monitor several systems in a
17 distributive fashion. And you know, the
18 challenge at that point was how do you
19 correlate. I think that was the main
20 technical challenge at that point in time
21 in terms of how do you collect -- collect
22 of the local detection result was not an
23 issue. The issue was how do you come up
24 with the intelligence, how do you correlate

1 all the relevant information and be able
2 to, you know, derive a certain logical or
3 reasonable conclusion, and able to, based
4 upon this result, take action accordingly.
5 I think that was the challenge, and the --
6 you know, we did look into that aspect.
7 But however at that point we did not have a
8 very promising, you know, development at
9 that time. At the conclusion of the
10 project. So that was, you know, the open
11 question at that point.

12 Q. And if you just saw the term correlate --

13 A. Um-hmm.

14 Q. -- what would that mean to you?

15 MS. PRESCOTT: Objection to form.

16 A. Correlate means how do you put two or more
17 than two input together and derive
18 meaningful information, or intelligence,
19 out of these different infrastreams of
20 information, and be able to come up with
21 certain rationale or logic that what this,
22 you know, behavior manifests to itself.

23 Probably that's kind of lengthy or
24 wordy, but that's my understanding of this

1 word, correlation.

2 MS. MOEHLMAN: Okay, let me go off
3 the record for two minutes.

4 VIDEOGRAPHER: Going off the record,
5 the time is 15:31.

6 (Continuing after recess.)

7 VIDEOGRAPHER: Back on the record,
8 the time is 1534.

9 MS. MOEHLMAN: Thank you very much
10 for your time today. We are concluded.

11 THE WITNESS: Okay. My pleasure.

12 VIDEOGRAPHER: This concludes volume
13 one of the deposition of Y. Frank Jou. The
14 videographer was Bob Collier for the firm
15 of Capital Reporting of Raleigh, North
16 Carolina. The deposition was held at the
17 offices of Smith Moore, Raleigh, North
18 Carolina, on January 27th, 2006. The
19 number of tapes used was three. The time
20 is 15:34.

21 [DEPOSITION CONCLUDED]
22
23
24

EXHIBIT VV

**EXHIBIT REDACTED
IN ITS ENTIRETY**

EXHIBIT WW

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

SRI INTERNATIONAL, INC., a California
Corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

INTERNET SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.,
a Delaware corporation, INTERNET
SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC., a Georgia
corporation, and SYMANTEC
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation,

Defendants.

Case No. 04-1199-SLR

**SRI INTERNATIONAL, INC.'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO
INTERROGATORIES NO. 12 AND NO. 15**

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 33, Plaintiff SRI
International, Inc. ("SRI") supplements its response to Defendant Symantec
Corporation's ("Symantec") Interrogatory No. 12 as follows:

GENERAL OBJECTIONS

SRI incorporates by reference all of its General Objections to Symantec's
Interrogatories Nos. 12 and 15.

RESPONSE

INTERROGATORY NO. 12:

For each asserted claim of the asserted patents, describe in detail all evidence of
"secondary considerations" that support your contention that the subject matter of the
claim is non-obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The term "secondary considerations" in this
interrogatory is in accordance with the manner in which it was used in *Graham v. John
Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). Your description should include an identification of
evidence of commercial success, long-felt need, copying by others, attempts by others to
solve any problem addressed by the accused patents, and acceptance in the industry or by

the public of any claimed invention.

For each asserted claim your answer should also include an identification of the three SRI employees (excluding attorneys) most knowledgeable about any such evidence of non-obviousness (listed in order from most knowledgeable to least knowledgeable) and an identification of all documents concerning such evidence.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12 (AUGUST 29, 2005):

SRI objects to this request on the grounds that it prematurely seeks SRI's contentions and the subject of expert testimony. SRI will abide by the schedule set forth by the Court's to respond fully to this interrogatory.

SRI further states that it will produce documents in its possession regarding any secondary considerations of non-obviousness that SRI is able to locate after a reasonable search and that could be arguably responsive to the request. SRI incorporates information contained in these documents pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d). The person most knowledgeable about the secondary considerations for the patents-in-suit is Peter Neuman.

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12 (OCTOBER 18, 2005):

SRI incorporates by reference its original response to Interrogatory No. 12. SRI provides the following additional information:

Documents with the following bates numbers ranges may contain information responsive to this interrogatory: SRI 000193-003207; SRI 003629-006630; SRI 007864-008974; SRI 016450-017430; SRI 018203-018434; SRI 019552-020262; SRI 027996-028715; SRI 029381-030492; SRI 037164-037391; SRI 044105-044106; SRI 044130-044131; SRI 044193; SRI 044196-044199; SRI 044295; SRI 050529-051726; SRI 053609-053624; SRI 053701-055815; SRI 075959-078987.

SRI further states that discovery in this case is ongoing. SRI reserves the right to supplement this response as additional information and documents become available.

FURTHER SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12
(NOVEMBER 18, 2005):

SRI incorporates by reference its original and first supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 12. SRI provides the following additional response:

SRI objects to this interrogatory as premature. The identification of secondary considerations of non-obviousness is only required once Symantec has made a prima facie showing of obviousness. SRI will provide a further response to this interrogatory at the time the Court's scheduling order has set for providing rebuttal contentions. In the event that Symantec makes an obviousness argument, SRI intends to rely at least on a showing of commercial success and long felt need.

THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12
(DECEMBER 15, 2005):

SRI incorporates by reference its previous responses to Interrogatory No. 12. SRI provides the following additional response:

SRI intends to rely on at least the following objective indicia of non-obviousness: commercial success of the accused products, praise in the marketplace (e.g., DARPA), long-felt need, and failure by others. The fact that many other research groups were attempting to create a practical solution to the problem of network intrusion detection, but that none were successful before SRI's inventions (See SRI's Response to Symantec's Invalidity Contentions) is strong evidence of non-obviousness.

INTERROGATORY NO. 15:

Identify each limitation of each claim of each of the asserted patents that SRI contends is not disclosed in the Network NIDES publication.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15

SRI objects that the phrase "Network NIDES publication" is vague and ambiguous in that the publication describes a host-based system rather than a network system. SRI objects to this request in that it prematurely seeks SRI's contentions and expert testimony. To the extent that Symantec provides SRI with contentions regarding any assertion that Symantec has about the invalidity of the patents-in-suit in light of the article "*Next-generation Intrusion Detection Expert System (NIDES) A Summary*," by Debra Anderson, Thane Frivold and Alfonso Valdes, Jan. 27, 1995, SRI will respond according to the procedural schedule the Court has set forth in this litigation.

Subject to, and without waiving the foregoing objections and general objections, SRI states that the claimed inventions of the patents-in-suit are not disclosed in the article "*Next-generation Intrusion Detection Expert System (NIDES) A Summary*," by Debra Anderson, Thane Frivold and Alfonso Valdes, Jan. 27, 1995.

SRI further states that its investigation is ongoing and that it reserves the right to supplement its response to this interrogatory as appropriate.

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15

SRI Incorporates by reference, its previous responses to Interrogatory No. 15 and further states that because Defendants' bear the burden of proof on invalidity, to the extent Defendants assert a detailed invalidity contention based in whole or in part on the cited article, SRI will provide a further response to this interrogatory at the time the Court's scheduling order has set for providing rebuttal contentions.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15
(DECEMBER 15, 2005):

SRI incorporates by reference its previous response to Interrogatory No. 15 and its discussion of "*Next-generation Intrusion Detection Expert System (NIDES) A*

Summary," by Debra Anderson, Thane Frivold and Alfonso Valdes, Jan. 27, 1995, in section 6 of its Response to Symantec Invalidity Contentions.

Dated: December 15, 2005

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on December 15, 2005, I served a copy of SRI
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EXHIBIT XX

**EXHIBIT REDACTED
IN ITS ENTIRETY**

EXHIBIT YY

INTRUSION DETECTION

Rebecca Gurley Bace



Intrusion Detection

Rebecca Gurley Bace

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runs on a Sybase database management system, using some of Sybase's internal triggers and other features.

NADIR remains one of the most successful and durable intrusion detection systems of the 1980s and has been extended to monitor systems beyond the ICN at Los Alamos. NADIR continues to monitor the ICN at the time of this publication, and the team continues to modify the system to accommodate new threats and target systems. The principal architect for NADIR is Kathleen Jackson.


1.2.3.6 NSM

The Network System Monitor (NSM) was developed at the University of California at Davis to run on a Sun UNIX workstation. It represented the first foray into monitoring network traffic and using that traffic as the primary data source. Before this time, most intrusion detection systems consumed information from operating system audit trails or keystroke monitors. The general architecture of the NSM is still reflected in many commercial intrusion detection products at the time of this publication. The NSM functioned by doing the following:

- Placing the system's Ethernet network interface card into promiscuous mode (in which each network frame generates an interrupt, thereby allowing the monitoring system to listen to all traffic, not just those packets addressed to the system)
- Capturing network packets
- Parsing the protocol to allow extraction of pertinent features as shown in Figure 1.4
- Using a matrix-based approach to archive and analyze the features, both for statistical variances from normal behavior and for violations of pre-established rules

NSM was a significant milestone in intrusion detection research because it was the first attempt to extend intrusion detection to heterogeneous network environments. It was also one of the first intrusion detection systems to run on an operational system (the computer science department local area network at UC Davis). In a widely cited, two-month test of NSM, it monitored more than 111,000 connections on the network segment, correctly identifying more than 300 of them as intrusions. The system administrators for the network discovered less than one percent of these intrusions. This test emphasized the need for and the effectiveness of intrusion detection systems as part of the protection suite. Principal architects for NSM were Karl Levitt, Todd Heberlein, and Biswanath Mukherjee of the University of California at Davis.¹⁵

Figure 1.2.3.7 NSM Architecture



1.2.3.7 Wisdom and Sense

Wisdom and Sense¹⁶ was an anomaly detection system developed by the Safeguards and Security Group at Los Alamos National Laboratory in partnership with Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Wisdom and Sense was the second pass at an intrusion detection system for mainframes (the initial system, called ALAP, was fielded by the U.S. Department of Energy in several of the department's facilities). Wisdom and Sense operated on a UNIX platform and analyzed audit data from Digital Equipment Corporation VAX/VMS systems. Wisdom and Sense performed statistical, rule-based analyses that were quite different from other systems of the time. The system used *nonparametric techniques* (which are statistical techniques that make no assumptions about the distribution of the data) to derive its own rulebase from archival audit data. Wisdom and Sense then compared subsequent activity to this rulebase, looking for exceptions. The rulebase was structured into

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 19th day of July, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing document, **REDACTED VERSION OF DECLARATION OF GEOFFREY M. GODFREY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' JOINT REPLY MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING INVALIDITY**, with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF which will send notification of such filing to the following:

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